

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (REVISED 6/2019)

### Required Core Seminars: PS 624 International Relations and PS 626 International Political Economy

All students taking either a major or a minor comprehensive exam in international relations must have read and show a mastery of the literature under the Core Theme on the International Relations Reading List as well as of the literature on TWO additional themes for MAJOR exams or ONE additional theme for MINOR exams.

The Reading List identifies required readings as well as strongly recommended readings. It should be noted that the Reading List is intended as a starting point to prepare students for each theme. As part of writing a contract with their committee, the student should also develop a list of readings for each theme that reflects the committee's and student's assessment of important new works not yet on the Reading List. The committee expects students' exams to reflect all relevant work in the field, whether or not those works are on the Reading List. Students are reminded that good comprehensive exams demonstrate the student's knowledge of important cases and the student's ability to apply theory to particular empirical contexts.

The International Relations field includes the following themes in addition to the Core theme: International Political Economy, International Security, and International Environmental Politics.

Students may also take an exam on the theme of "Foreign Policy and Decision Making." To develop an appropriate reading list for that theme, the student is required to contact the field committee chair no later than week 1 of the prior Spring term for a Fall term exam or week 1 of the prior Fall term for either a Winter term or Spring term exam.

### Additional Information:

The goal of the comp exam process in International Relations is to foster your knowledge of the field. Successful preparation should leave you "knowing the field" well enough to identify interesting questions for a dissertation, have an understanding of available theories and cases for answering that question, and have a sense of the "look and feel" of compelling and convincing arguments in the field. Preparation for the exam should also position you so that you are 60-80% of the way to being prepared to teach an introductory undergraduate course in International Relations.

The IR field committee has produced a document entitled "Strategy for taking comprehensive exams in International Relations". All students interested in taking a comprehensive exam in International Relations should read this document at the earliest opportunity.

### Comprehensive Exams:

The exam takes place in a one-day, eight-hour time period, plus one hour for lunch. Non-native English speakers are allowed nine hours, plus one hour for lunch. The exam is closed book; students leave their belongings in the department office and write the exam on a department

computer in a room or office provided by the department. Students will be given their questions at 9:00 AM and must perform a final save of their answers to the exam laptop no later than 6:00 PM (7:00 PM for non-native English speakers).

Students are reminded that all exams must meet all University of Oregon requirements related to academic integrity. While taking the exam, students are not allowed to discuss it with other people. The exam is open-book, but students must give credits or have proper citations for the work and ideas of others. The exam will be put through plagiarism software, and plagiarism, if found, will result in a failure and likely disqualification from the program.

#### Major Exam:

This exam will have three sections

- i. Core Theme: answer 1 (of 2 or more) questions provided by the committee, which will cover the full breadth of the Core Theme on the Reading List.
- ii. Additional Theme #1: answer 1 of 2 (or more) questions provided by the committee that will cover the full breadth of the student's chosen additional field.
- iii. Additional Theme #2: answer 1 of 2 (or more) questions provided by the committee that will cover the full breadth of the student's chosen additional field.

#### Minor Exam:

The minor exam is comprised of the first two sections of the major exam. Minor exam takers have six hours, plus an hour for lunch, and take the exam under the same conditions as the major. The exam begins at 9:00 AM and must be completed by 4:00 PM (5:00 PM for non-native English speakers).

**Exam committees will consist of three members decided upon by the field chair in consultation with the subfield committee members.**

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS READING LIST

### Core Theme

Reus-Smit, C. and D. Snidal. 2008. *The Oxford handbook of international relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carlsnaes, W., et al. 2013. *Handbook of international relations*, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Fearon, J. D. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Fearon, J. D. 1998. Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. *International Organization* 52 (2): 269–305.

Finnemore, M. 1996. *National interests in international society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hasenclever, A., et al. 1997. *Theories of international regimes*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ikenberry, G. J. 2000. *After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ikenberry, G. J. 2011. *Liberal leviathan: the origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Keck, M. E. and K. Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keohane, R. O. 1984. *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, S. D. 1983. *International regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Jervis, R. 1999. Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: Understanding the debate. *International Security* 24 (1): 42–63.

Koremenos, B., C. Lipson, and D. Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4): 761–99.

Stone, R. W. 2011. *Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lake, D. and R. Powell. 1999. *Strategic choice and international relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Levy, J. 1997. Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 87–112.

Mearsheimer, J. J. 2014. *The tragedy of great power politics* (updated edition). New York: W. W. Norton.

Grieco, J. M. 1995. The Maastricht Treaty, economic and monetary union and the neo-realist research programme. *Review of International Studies* 21 (1): 21–40.

Schweller, R. L., and D. Priess. 1997. A tale of two realisms: expanding the institutions debate. *Mershon International Studies Review* 41 (1): 1–32.

Moravcsik, A. 1997. Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics. *International Organization* 51 (4): 513–53.

Putnam, R. D. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International Organization* 42 (3): 427–60.

Russett, B. and J. Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating peace: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations*. New York: Norton.

Schultz, K. A. 1999. Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. *International Organization* 53: 233–266.

Waltz, K. 1979. *Theory of international politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Wohlforth, W. C. 2009. Unipolarity, status competition, and great power war. *World Politics* 61: 28–57.

Monteiro, N.P. 2011/12. Unrest assured: Why unipolarity is not peaceful. *International Security* 36 (1): 9–40.

Paul, T.V. 2018. *Restraining great powers: soft balancing from empires to the global era*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Levy, J. S. 2008. "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China." In *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, eds. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wendt, A. 1999. *Social theory of international politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Parsons, C. 2002. Showing ideas as causes: the origins of the European Union. *International Organization* 56 (1): 47–84.

**International Political Economy Theme**  
**(Lead Faculty Members: Skalnes, Tan)**

The list is meant to offer examples of some the variety of arguments in IPE. The recommended readings are meant to provide some guidance for those who would like to delve more deeply into a topic.

**Overviews and Meta-Theory**

Frieden, Jeffrey A. and Lisa L. Martin. 2002. "International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interaction." In Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, pp. 118–46.

Cohen, Benjamin J. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History* (2008).

Alt, James E., Jeffrey Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry. *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (December), pp. 689–717.

Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons. 2010. "Introduction: The Case for Constructivist Political Economy." In Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons (eds.) *Constructing the International Economy*.

Lake, David A. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *The Review of International Organizations* 4 (September): 219–244.

Oatley, Thomas. 2011. The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. *International Organization* 65 (2): 311–41.

Blyth, Mark and Matthias Matthijs. 2017. Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the Mystery of IPE's Missing Macroeconomy. *Review of International Political Economy* 24 (2): 203–31.

**Recommended:**

Frieden, Jeffrey A. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (2006).

For a history of the international monetary systems, see Barry Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System* (1996).

Useful on the evolution of the trade regime since World War II is John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling, and Richard H. Steinberg. 2006. *The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO*.

An excellent collection of IPE articles is Mark Blyth, ed. *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation*. This collection is especially valuable in offering perspectives on IPE from scholars outside the American school of IPE.

Lake, David A. 2006. "International Political Economy: A Maturing Interdiscipline." In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

"Not So Quiet on the Western Front: The American School of IPE." Special issue of *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (February 2009).

Paul, Darel E. 2006. Teaching Political Economy in Political Science: A Review of International and Comparative Political Economy Syllabi. *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (December): 729–34.

### **Individual Preferences**

Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences? *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2): 267–92.

Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade. *International Organization* 60 (2): 469–98.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63 (3): 425–57.

Ahlquist, John S., Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi. 2014. Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle. *International Organization* 68 (1): 33–75.

Guisinger, Alexandra. 2017. *American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

### **Domestic-Level Theories**

#### **1. Classes, Interest Groups, and Firms**

Nelson, Douglas. 1988. Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey. *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (August): 796–837.

Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. *American Economic Review* 84 (4): 833–50.

Gawande, Kishore and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States. *International Organization* 60 (3): 527–61.

Rogowski, Ronald 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1121–37.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 2015. *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Melitz, Marc J. 2003. The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity. *Econometrica* 71 (6): 1695–725.

Melitz, Marc J. and Daniel Trefler. 2012. Gains from Trade When Firms Matter. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26 (2): 91–118.

Peters, Margaret E. 2014. Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States. *International Organization* 68 (4): 811–44.

Peters, Margaret E. 2017. *Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

In Song Kim. 2017. Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization *American Political Science Review* 111 (1): 1-20.

## **2. Political Regime and Domestic Institutions**

Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. *World Politics* 49 (3): 309–38.

Goldstein, Judith and Robert Gulotty. 2014. America and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform. *International Organization* 68 (2): 263–95.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. *American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 305–21.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. 2010. Regime Type, Veto Points, and Preferential Trading Arrangements. *Stanford Journal of International Law* 46 (2): 219–42.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. 2012. *Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements*.

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy." *World Politics* 49 (April): 309–38.

Lohmann, Susanne and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. *International Organization* 48 (Autumn): 595–632.

Bernhard, William T., J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark, eds., 2003. *The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions*. [Also available as a special issue of *International Organization* 56 (Autumn 2002)]

Goldstein, Judith. 1993. *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. *American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 305–21.

Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59 (1): 107–43.

Verdier, Daniel. 1998. Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization under the Gold Standard, 1870–1914. *International Organization* 52 (Winter): 1–34.

Broz, J. Lawrence and Seth H. Werfel. 2014. Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection. *International Organization* 68 (2): 393–416.

Steinberg, David and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy. *World Politics* 66 (3): 491–529.

Jensen, Nathan. 2003. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 57 (3): 587–616.

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. *International Organization* 60 (4): 811–846.

Recommended:

Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises*.

Katzenstein, Peter, ed., 1978. *Between Power and Plenty*.

Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization* 53 (Autumn): 669–98.



Karol, David. 2000. Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing? *International Organization* 54 (Autumn): 825–44.

Simmons, Beth A. 1994. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years*.

## Systemic-Level Theories

### 1. Power

Krasner, Stephen. 1976. State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. *World Politics* 28 (April): 317–47.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. *International Organization* 39 (Autumn), pp. 579–614.

Eichengreen, Barry. 1990. "Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System." In *Elusive Stability: Essays in the History of International Finance*, chap. 11.

Lake, David A. 1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential? *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (December), pp. 459–89.

Gowa, Joanne and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. Power Politics and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 408–20.

Mastanduno, Michael. 1998. Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship. *International Organization* 52 (Autumn): 825–54.

Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339–74.

Hopewell, Kristen. 2015. Different Paths to Power: The Rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization. *Review of International Political Economy* 22 (2): 311–38.

Andrews, David M. 2006. *International Monetary Power*.

Stone, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*, chaps. 2-3.

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2014. *American Power after the Financial Crisis*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman. 2019. Weaponized Interdependence How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. *International Security*. 44 (1): 42–79.

## 2. International Institutions

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. 1999. An Economic Theory of GATT. *American Economic Review* 89 (1): 215–48.

Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization* 55 (4): 829–57.

Koremenos, Barbara. 2007. If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolutions Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining? *Journal of Legal Studies* 16 (1): 189–212.

Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization* 61 (1): 37–67.

Davis, Christina 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 153–69.

Büthe, Tim and Helen Milner. 2008. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 741–62.

Allison Carnegie. 2014. States Held Hostage: Political Hold-up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions. *American Political Science Review*. 108 (01): 54-70

Julia Gray. 2018. Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (1): 1–13.

### The Second Image Reversed

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. The Second Image Reversed. *International Organization* 32 (Autumn): 881–912.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions. *International Organization* 41 (Spring): 203–24.

Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner, eds., 1996. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*.

### Recommended:

Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*.

Mosley, Layna. 2000. Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. *International Organization* 54:4 (Autumn): 737–73.

Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining Is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (October), pp. 1003–1027.

Goodman, John B. and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets. *World Politics* 46 (October 1993): 50–82.

### **Ideas**

Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework.” In *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, pp. 3–30.

Morrison, James Ashley. 2012. Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization. *International Organization* 66 (3): 395–428.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization* 36: 379–415.

Lang, Andrew T. F. 2006. Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime. *Journal of International Economic Law* 9 (March): 81–116.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. 2007. Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets. *International Organization* 61 (2): 443–63.

Woll, Cornelia. 2010. “Firm Interests in Uncertain Times: Business Lobbying in Multilateral Service Liberalization.” In Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, eds., *Constructing the International Economy*, pp. 137–54.

Nelson, Stephen and Peter Katzenstein. 2014. Risk, Uncertainty, and the Financial Crisis of 2008. *International Organization* 68 (2): 361–92.

Farrell, Henry and John Quiggin. 2017. Consensus, Dissensus, and Economic Ideas: Economic Crisis and the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism. *International Studies Quarterly* 61 (2): 269–83.

### **Strategic Interaction and Two-Level Games**

Richardson, J. David. 1990. The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy. *International Organization* 44 (Winter): 107–35.

Stegemann, Klaus. 1989. Political Rivalry among Industrial States: What Can We Learn from Models of Strategic Trade Policy? *International Organization* 43 (Winter): 73–100.

Stone, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*.

Recommended:

Busch, Marc L. 1999. *Trade Warriors: States, Firms, and Strategic Policy in High Technology Competition*.

Martin, Lisa L. 1992. *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*.

Milner, Helen V. 1997. *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*.

International Security Theme  
(Lead Faculty Member: Cramer)

**Important Overviews**

Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. *Causes of War*. 1st ed. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. [Most important overview—notice Jack S. Levy writes literature reviews for security often; read his literature reviews to see updates in the field, such as in the Carlsnaes *Handbook of IR*.]

Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Seventh edition (2009)

Richard K. Betts, *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, Fifth edition, 2017

Manus I. Midlarsky, *Handbook of War Studies* (1989).\*\*\*

**Classics of Security Studies – recommended to know \*\*\***

Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Man, the State and War: a theoretical analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press (1954). \*\*\*

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton University Press edition, recommended)—(if interested, see Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (1983). \*\*\*

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. \*\*\*

Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (1939) \*\*\*

Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948). \*\*\*

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (1966) and *The Strategy of Conflict* (1980). \*\*\*

Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1965) and *War and Politics* (1973) \*\*\*

Wright, Quincy, *A Study of War*, 2nd rev. ed., (1965 [1942]) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. \*\*\*

Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (1981) \*\*\*

**Causes of War**

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (1973) \*\*\* [Classic work, leading to many research programs.]

Michael E. Brown et al (editors), *Theories of War and Peace* (1998).

Michael E. Brown et al (editors), *Debating the Democratic Peace* (1996) (recommended)

Waltz, K. 1979. *Theory of international politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. [Assigned in Core; essential here.]

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, 30:2 (January 1978), pp.186-214. This can be found in Art & Waltz, *The Use of Force*.

Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (1999).

Sean M Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies* 4:4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-694.

Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-95): 50-90

John J. Mearsheimer, "Realists as Idealists" *Security Studies* 20 (2011) 424-430

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (updated edition, 2014)

John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 77-93.

Jack S. Levy, "Preventive War and Democratic Politics" *International Studies Quarterly* (2008)

Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (2005)

Laura Sjoberg "Gender, Structure and War: What Waltz Couldn't See" *International Theory* (2012)

Joshua S. Goldstein, *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001)

Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" *Survival* 1998/99

**Recommended for reference:**

Greg Cashman, *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict* (1993).

Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (2000)

Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations" *International Security* (1996)

Manus I. Midlarsky, *Handbook of War Studies* (1989).\*\*\*

John M. Owen *Liberal Peace Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (1997)

### **Grand Strategy, explaining Grand Strategy, and debating the rise of China**

Joseph A. Ford, "Examining the Case for Restraint in U.S. Grand Strategy," Working Paper, January 2018 [Up to date review of the current debate with all of the main articles cited.]

Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment" *International Security* Winter 2012/13, Vol. 37, No. 3: 7–51.

Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* (2014)

Shorter version: "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy" *Foreign Affairs* Jan/Feb 2013

Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (1984).

Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997)

Peter J. Katzenstein, (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, (1996)

M. Taylor Fravel, "International Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for Territorial Expansion," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 2010)

M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: Explaining the Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No 2 (Fall 2010) (with Evan S. Medeiros)

### **Recommended:**

Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure" *International Security* 36 no. 3 (Winter 2011/12) pp. 41-78.

Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (1993).

Jeffrey Lewis, *The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age* (2007)

Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (1991).

Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (1994).

Marc Trachtenberg, *History & Strategy* (1991).

John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (1982).

### **Interventions and Peacekeeping**

Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (2003)

Virginia Page Fortna *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* Princeton University Press (2008)

### **Civil-Military Relation, Militarism and Organization Theory**

Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1982). \*\*\* [Classic book recommended.]

Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (editors), *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* The Johns Hopkins University Press (2009)

Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy* (1974). \*\*\* [Classic book recommended.]

Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, Oxford (2005). [Recommended]

Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (1984).

Volker R. Berghahn, *Militarism: The History of the International Debate 1861-1979* (1982). \*\*\* [Classic book recommended.]

### **Alliances**

Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*, Cambridge University Press, (2012)

Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (1987).



Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity." *International Organization* 44:2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.

Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (1997). [Recommended]

Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48 (August 1966) [Recommended]

### **Threat Perception and Misperception**

Robert Jervis, *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics* (2017)

Dominic Johnson, *Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions* (2004)

Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, "Why Hawks Win" *Foreign Policy* (Jan/Feb 2007)

Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception." In Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1976), pp. 78-119. \*\*\* [Classic piece, recommended.]

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### **Journals to read**

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*International Environmental Agreements*

*Journal of Environment and Development*

*Global Governance* (selected environmental articles)

*International Organization* (selected environmental articles)

*World Politics* (selected environmental articles)